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Abstract: In this paper, we consider whether there is statistical evidence for a 
causal relationship between federal government expenditures and growth in real 
per-capita GDP in the United States, using available data going back to 1792. 
After studying the time-series properties of these variables for stationarity and 
cointegration, we investigate Granger causality in detail in the context of a Vector 
Error Correction Model. While we find causal evidence supporting Wagner’s 
Law, we find no evidence supporting the common assertion that a larger 






There are few ideological debates in economics more fundamental than whether or not a larger 
government is bad for growth, even aside from its more normative effects on economic freedom. 
In the United States, the Club for Growth, for example, supports candidates who endorse 
reducing the size and economic role of government, on the assertion that these policies favor 
faster economic growth. In both theory and in the data, however, the effects are more mixed.  
In addition to the short-run fiscal effects of government expenditures on real aggregate 
demand in an economy with excess capacity, Poot (2000) argued that there are at least seven 
separate effects of government spending on growth. These include, among other factors, the 
provision of pure and quasi public goods, the distortionary effect of taxes on resource allocation, 
and the comparative inefficiency of government control over resources and production, relative 
to the private sector it replaces. All things considered, Barro (1990) has made a persuasive case 
that the aggregate relationship between the size of government and economic growth may be 
shaped like an inverted-U, with low growth resulting from both too little and too much 
government. 
  2On the empirical front, Landau (1983, 1986) found a negative effect of government 
consumption on growth, while Ram (1986) found a positive effect, and the international 
evidence uncovered over the last two decades has remained decidedly mixed. In his survey, 
Slemrod (1995) argues that the aggregate effect of government involvement is negligible, though 
some types of taxes affect some behaviors significantly. Engen and Skinner (1996) focus on the 
effect of taxes, and they find mildly negative effects for some taxes and positive effects for 
others, but like much of the rest of the literature, the effects of larger government are 
contradictory, ambiguous, and in the aggregate rather minimal. Plümper and Martin (2003) 
found a negative effect of government on growth primarily in non-democratic countries, a result 
generally consistent with the findings of Guseh (1997) and Scully (2001). In a recent survey, 
Poot (2000) cited 41 studies, with seven finding a positive effect, twelve finding a negative 
effect, and 23 inconclusive. Even more recently, Lee and Lin (2007) found a negative effect of 
government that became insignificant once demographic factors were taken into account.  
The bivariate causal relationship between government size and economic growth is 
complicated by the potential for reverse causation, since GDP growth can also lead  to increased 
government spending, an effect that is frequently referred to, in a broad sense, as “Wagner’s 
law.” (Wagner, 1893). As Baumol and Bowen (1965) first noted for the example of orchestras, 
many labor-intensive services have inherently lower rates of productivity improvement, while 
wages are driven by productivity improvements elsewhere. As a result, a growing economy will 
tend to have a rising share of income spent on services, many of which are likely to be provided 
by government, and this leads to a so-called “cost disease” of rising government share. Wagner’s 
law of increasing state spending, the thesis that government’s role increases as a country 
industrializes, has also been interpreted to imply an income elasticity for government 
  3expenditures greater than one, although Peacock and Scott (2000) argue that this relationship is 
usually misspecified. As with the previous causal relationship, there is also a substantial 
literature testing whether economic growth leads to a larger government. Recent examples 
include Jackson, et al. (1998), Demirbas (1999), Islam (2001), and Halicioglu (2003). 
  A common methodological pitfall in the literature that tries to uncover the causal links 
between government size and long-term economic growth is that they regularly conduct Granger 
causality tests outside the cointegration framework.
1 As is well-known, this problem may render 
many of their conclusions invalid (Granger, 1988). Furthermore, the papers that do place their 
Granger causality analyses within the cointegration framework do not tend to implement a 
Vector Error Correction (VEC) model, which is the natural follow up in the case in which the 
variables are cointegrated, given that the definitive test of causality lies with the error correction 
term (Engle and Granger, 1987; Granger, 1988).
2     
In this paper, we begin in section two with a brief description of government size and 
economic growth over the long-term for the case of the US, using data going back to 1792. We 
then estimate an unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR) model and, after checking for the 
model’s stability, we use impulse-response analysis as a way to get first estimates of the inter-
relations between government size and economic growth for the case of the United States. In 
section four, we study the time series properties of the data, testing for stationarity and 
cointegration; we also perform traditional Granger causality tests outside the cointegration 
framework as a way to see what our data say when traditional methods are applied and as a way 
to compare our results with previous contributions. In the fifth section we exploit the results from 
                                                 
1 Ghali (1998) and Islam (2001) are among the exceptions. 
2 The only exception we could find is Ghali (1998), who implements VEC models in a setup with multiple cross-
sections (ten advanced countries), but short time spans (quarterly data for the period 1970-94). Islam (2001) 
implements Johansen-Juselius’ weak exogeneity tests, but reports no VEC model. 
  4cointegration analysis and implement a VEC model that sheds clear light on the issue of 
causation. We conclude with a brief summary and suggestions for further research. 
 
2. Government Size and Economic Growth in the United States 
There are many ways to measure the size and scope of government intervention, but the most 
common metric is the relative amount of government expenditures, including both government 
purchases and transfers. Federal government expenditures (G) as a share of GDP (Y) remained 
low prior to the Great Depression, with exception to wartime: G/Y rose to an annual high of five 
percent of GDP during the War of 1812, 19.5 percent during the Civil War, and 30 percent 
during World War I. The G/Y ratio dramatically increased during FDR’s Administration at the 
federal level. After the Great Depression, G/Y peaked at 47.5 percent during World War II, but 
afterwards it generally ranged from 20 to 25 percent. State and local expenditures, meanwhile, 
actually fell during the Roosevelt Administration, from over seven percent during the Hoover 
Administration to under five percent by 1945.  
From the Truman Administration through the Reagan Administration, government 
spending continued to rise, to an average of 22.5 percent of GDP for federal spending in the first 
half of the 1980s and an average of almost eleven percent of GDP for state and local 
expenditures. By the first half of the 1990s, total government expenditures in the United States 
summed to one third of GDP, though this fell somewhat during the Clinton Administration. 
How did this secular increase in government size affect growth on the margin in the 
United States? Gwartney, Lawson, and Holcombe (1998) argued that the size of government in 
the first half of the 1960s was close to the optimal level, and estimated that U.S. incomes would 
have been 20 percent higher in 1996 had government stayed the same relative size. But they 
  5chose to make their case using the period 1960-65 as their growth baseline, a half-decade with 
the highest growth rates in postwar American history and, until the Kennedy tax cuts went into 
effect in 1964, a period characterized by a maximum marginal tax rate of 91 percent on unearned 
income. They then compared this to the period 1990-95, a half-decade which began with a 
recession, to argue that growth in government reduced economic growth. Yet even as they wrote 
their paper, the economy was beginning to once again grow at a pace not seen since, well, the 
early 1960s. 
To more carefully analyze the effect of government spending on growth, we compile 
annual GDP data provided by Johnston and Williamson (2006), and federal expenditure data 
provided by Garrett and Rhine (2006). Both sets of data contain annual data spanning the period 
1792-2004, thus providing a unique opportunity to investigate the long-run relationship between 
government size and economic growth. Like Jones and Joulfain (1991), who investigate the 
relationship between expenditures and revenues prior to the Civil War, we focus on the federal 
budget and exclude state and local government expenditures from our analysis because of data 
availability.  
Some summary statistics for our dataset are provided in Table 1. Average annual growth 
rate for real GDP generally declined over time, seemingly lending credence to the argument that 
the rising size of government after FDR slowed economic growth. But population growth rates 
were significantly higher before the Great Depression, and the average real growth rate per 
capita was actually faster after 1950, when the government was significantly larger. 
Furthermore, the standard deviation of growth was smaller, suggesting that the growth of 
government was not only correlated with faster growth, but also correlated with more economic 
stability. While G/Y was much higher after the Roosevelt Administration than before, it also 
  6became much more stable. For the periods of comparison used by Gwartney, et al. (1998), for 
example, we find that G/Y was only slightly higher in the latter period, 22.4 percent of GDP in 
1991-1995 versus 21.7 percent in 1961-1965. 
Is the United States on the downward-sloping side of Barro’s inverted U? In other words, 
is the marginal effect of government bad for economic growth in the U.S.? For the economies of 
Western Europe, many economists would argue that the marginal effect of government on 
growth is negative, but the evidence is weaker that this is also true for the United States.
3 
According to Gwartney, et al. (1998), the United States in the mid-1990s had the smallest total 
government expenditure share of all the OECD countries, and also the smallest growth in 
government’s share during the postwar period. If any developed market economy is on the lower, 
upward-sloping portion of curve, it seems to follow that it should be the United States. 
Islam (2001) recently investigated the relationship between total government 
expenditures and growth in order to test for Wagner’s law, using U.S. data from the U.S. 
Department of Commerce spanning the period 1929-1996, and found a long-term equilibrium 
relationship between economic growth and the share of government expenditures, with causality 
that supported Wagner’s Law but not the reverse. Like Islam, we estimate whether or not such a 
cointegrating relationship exists for the U.S., though we consider a much longer time-series and 
we investigate both causality issues and the dynamic relationship in more detail. Others have 
used similar methods to investigate this question for other countries, or in other cases. One of the 
earlier examples is that of Conte and Darrat (1987), who use Granger causality tests to reject the 
hypothesis that public sector expansion in postwar OECD economies negatively influenced real 
GDP growth rates. Ghali (1998) used a multivariate cointegration approach with several 
                                                 
3 Lindert (2004) provides a compelling case defying the view that economies with larger welfare states grow more 
slowly.  
  7variables, including GDP and government spending among others, for a sample of OECD 
countries, while Jones and Joulfain (1991) used cointegration tests and error correction models to 
find evidence of short-term and long-term causality relationships in the United States between 
federal revenues and expenditures. 
 
3. A First Approach to the Evidence: An Unrestricted VAR Impulse-Response Analysis 
As a first approach to analyzing the effect of G/Y on growth in the United States, we estimate an 
unrestricted VAR model from which we extract impulse-response results. An advantage of using 
an unrestricted VAR model is that it implies a non-committal approach to the data in which 
issues of causation, timing and appropriate structural restrictions are temporarily left on hold, 
awaiting further analysis.  
 
3.1. An Unrestricted VAR model: 
We start by defining y as the natural logarithm of U.S. real per-capita GDP, and g = 
ln(G/Y), i.e. as the natural logarithm of the ratio of federal government expenditures, including 
transfers, to real GDP. These data are shown in Figure 1, which strongly suggests that neither 
variable is stationary in their levels. As is well-known, running regressions involving I(1) 
variables may give rise to spurious results and multiple inference and interpretations problems, 
given that the F-statistic does not follow the tabulated values of Fisher’s F distribution (Granger 
& Newbold, 1974). In Figures 2(a) and 2(b), we show the first differences of these variables, and 
these appear to stationary. A common specification in the literature regresses rate of growth of 
real GDP, either per-capita or not, on G/Y and other variables, but this most likely leads to 
misspecification, since regressing a stationary dependent variable on independent variables 
  8which are not stationary is an approach that Granger (1986: 216) argues “makes no sense as the 
independent and dependent variables have such vastly different temporal properties.” Indeed, the 
expected coefficient(s) from such a regression would be zero in such a case. Therefore, instead 
of the commonly-used model ∆Y/Y = f(G/Y), our estimable VAR model uses both variables in 
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Since only lagged values of the endogenous variables appear on the right-hand side of the 
equations, simultaneity is not an issue and equation-by-equation OLS yields consistent estimates. 
Moreover, even though the error terms may be contemporaneously correlated, OLS is efficient 
and equivalent to GLS since all equations have identical regressors.  
To determine the optimal number of lags in the VAR model, which is important to make 
sure that the residuals are uncorrelated and homoskedastic across time periods, we try a battery 
of selection criteria, with each test performed at the five percent significance level.  These 
include a sequentially modified Likelihood Ratio (LR) test, a Final Prediction Error (FPE) test, 
an Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) test, the Hannan-Quinn (HQ) Information Criterion test, 
and the Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC) test. As is shown in Table 2, the first three 
indicators suggest the use of four lags, whereas the last two criteria suggest the use of one lag. 
Given that a Wald test on parameter restrictions rejects the null hypothesis that there are no lags 
of any order higher than unity, we opted for a four-lag specification in line with the first three 
criteria. This selection will be further justified by Granger causality tests in section 4.2. below. 
  9Table 3 contains the estimates of our VAR(4) model. The first column reports the 
estimate of the growth in the size of the government equation, and the second column reports the 
estimate of the economic growth equation. As usual with macroeconomic series, the 
autoregressive components are important statistical determinants of both series in both columns. 
Both the first and the second lags of economic growth per capita are statistically significant 
explanatory factors for the size of the federal government, while none of the lags of government 
size growth are statistically significant in explaining economic growth per capita in the second 
equation.  
In order for the VAR to be stationary, all the inverse roots of the characteristic AR 
polynomial must lie inside the unit circle. If this is not the case, impulse-response inferences are 
not valid. In this case, the modulus values are 0.80, 0.64, 0.43, and 0.16, and so the VAR is 
stationary and we can proceed to the impulse-response analysis. 
 
3.2. Impulse Response Analysis: 
To clarify the overall effects of innovations to both endogenous variables over a long 
time horizon, we report accumulated impulse-response graphs over a ten-year window in Figures 
3(a) and Figure 3(b). Economic growth appears to have a statistically significant accumulated 
effect on the growth in the size of the government in year 4, a finding that lends support to 
Wagner’s law, while the size of the federal government has statistically-insignificant effects on 
economic growth at all lags.  
The orthogonalization of impulses to identify shocks is known to be sensitive to the order 
in which the variables are declared. Figures 3(a) and 3(b) show the case in which g is entered 
  10first (i.e., assumed to be less endogenous), but the results are almost identical if we reverse the 
order.  
 
3.3. Block ExogeneityTests:  
 Table 4 contains standard block exogeneity tests (pairwise Granger causality tests) for 
government and economic growth per capita. Results are unambiguous: the lags of economic 
growth display block exogeneity, but the lags of government size growth do not. The number of 
lags included in the tests displayed in Table 4 ranges from 4 to 10. No block exogeneity can be 
identified if less than 4 lags are included in the tests, suggesting either mis-specification due to 
insufficient lags or a lack of cointegration, an issue that will be tackled in the next section. 
Including a larger set of lags (we tried with up to 20 lags) does not change results: the lags of 
economic growth display block exogeneity but the lags of government size growth do not. This 
result is later confirmed when causality is tackled by means of a VEC model. 
This initial approach undertaken so far is not free of problems. Problems with the 
unrestricted VAR model approach include inefficient estimation due to over-parameterization 
(see Zellner, 1988, among others) and mis-specification when the data are first-differenced and 
the variables are cointegrated (Engle and Granger, 1987), which is potentially the case here. 
Hence, more analysis is needed.  
 
4. Stationarity and Cointegration 
A more precise and rigorous statistical analysis of the inter-relations between government and 
economic growth requires a careful study of the time series properties of the series at hand. We 
proceed in three steps. We consider the issue of stationarity (or lack thereof) first. After having 
  11studied the stationarity properties of the series, we start our search for valid restrictions to our 
VAR(4) model. Our search starts in the last part of this section with cointegration analysis. 
Cointegration analysis is important because provided both variables (y and g) are non-stationary, 
if a long-term equilibrium relationship between government and economic growth exists, the 
data can be modeled by means of a Vector Error Correction (VEC) model, which helps improve 
the econometric fit by tying the short-run dynamics to the long-run relationship between both  
variables. On the other hand, if the government and economic growth series turn out to not be 
cointegrated, then VEC restrictions would not be appropriate (Engle and Granger, 1987). 
 
4.1. Stationarity Issues:  
We searched for unit roots using regressions that included a constant, one lag of the 
variable in levels and one lag of the variable in first differences as augmentation terms. 
Alternatively, a linear trend was also added to the specifications. All tests provide a uniform 
message: both series have unit roots in their levels (i.e., they are I(1) processes) and both series 
are I(0) processes in their first differences.
4 This confirms the intuition provided by Figures 1 
and 2, and confirms that it would have been inappropriate to postulate the unrestricted VAR 
model in the levels of the variables y and g. Table 5 provides the tests without a linear trend (i.e., 
including only a constant and the augmentation terms).
5  
 
                                                 
4 For a more detailed discussion on unit roots in US GDP, the reader is referred to Murray and Nelson (1998) and 
the literature that follows them. 
5 Like all other results in this paper which are not reported in detail, results which include a linear trend are available 
on request. 
  124.2. Cointegration Analysis: 
If these series are cointegrated, causality tests conducted outside the cointegration 
analysis framework may lead to incorrect causal inferences, since the error correction term is 
omitted in the specifications used to test for Granger causality (see Granger, 1988 for additional 
discussion). Hence, to account for that difficulty we follow a two step procedure in what follows. 
First, we check if the series y and g, which have been shown to be I(1), are cointegrated. Second, 
if the hypothesis that the series are not cointegrated is rejected, we implement a VEC model in 
order to double check the results on block exogeneity reported in section 3.3. If cointegration test 
results show the presence of only one cointegrating equation, the one in which g is the dependent 
variable and y the explanatory one, and the VECM model contains only one statistically 
significant error correction term in the dynamic equations then, and only then, the block 
exogeneity test results reported in section 3.3 are valid (Granger, 1988).  
  In general, if two variables such as g and y are both I(1), any combination of these 
variables, such as z = g – a y will also be I(1), where z is called the equilibrium error term. 
However, there may exist a singularity a*, such that g - a* y is I(0). If such a singularity exists, g 
and y are said to be cointegrated. This implies that in the long-run, although g and y can be 
arbitrarily high or low, they must be proportional to each other, with a factor of proportionality 
a*. It is clearly possible for more than one equilibrium relation to govern the joint behavior of 
the variables. 
Johansen test statistics are shown in Table 6. Following Johansen’s methodology, the 
existence of a deterministic linear trend in the data was tested and could not be rejected. 
Therefore, the test specification includes such a trend. Both the Trace and the Maximum 
Eigenvalue tests reject the hypothesis on no cointegration between g and y, but only at the six 
  13percent level. A similar problem affects Islam’s (2001) cointegration analysis, in which he used a 
shorter sample spanning the period 1929-1996 and got statistically significant results only at the 
ten percent level. More analysis on cointegration is thus needed and is conducted below in the 
context of a VEC model.  
 
5. An Error Correction Model 
Engle and Granger (1987) have shown that if two variables are cointegrated, then there must 
exist a VEC linking these variables. Furthermore, the VEC representation of the bivariate system 
of cointegrated variables sheds light on the direction of causation between those variables 
(Granger, 1988). 
 
5.1. Methodological preliminaries: 
Following Engle and Granger (1987) the VEC model is formulated as follows: 
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where L is the lag operator, T is the number of lags to be included, and the error correction terms 
are given by   for j = 1, 2, which are the residuals from the OLS static regressions of g on 
y and vice versa, respectively. In equations (3) and (4), the VEC model allows for the finding 
1 ) ( − t j E
  14that g Granger-causes y, or vice versa, so long as the corresponding error correction term carries 
a statistically significant coefficient, even if the estimated dj coefficients are not jointly 
statistically significant (Granger, 1988). If g and y are cointegrated, then the error correction 
terms are stationary, I(0) processes. Conversely, if the residuals from the static regressions 
involving g and y are I(0), then g and y are cointegrated (Engle and Granger, 1987). 
  The estimation of the VEC model proceeds in two steps. First, the static equations in the 
variables’ levels are estimated, providing estimates of the cointegrating parameters of the long-
term relationship between g and y and the residuals that will enter into equations (3) and (4). 
Second, the residuals stemming from the static equation estimates are then lagged one period and 
used in the second step to estimate (3) and (4).  
 
5.2. Estimation of the Static Equations: 
  The first part of Table 7 shows the OLS estimate for the first static equation, followed by 
several stationarity tests on the residuals from that regression. Non-stationarity can be soundly 
rejected in all tests at the one percent level, and the main economic result is that the long-run 
income elasticity for the relative size of the federal government is roughly 0.8, which is much 
higher than the 0.4 value previously estimated by Islam (2001) for the period 1929-1996. The 
second part shows the OLS estimate for the second static equation, followed again by stationarity 
tests for the residuals. Again, non-stationarity can be soundly rejected at the one percent level in 
all cases but the DF-GLS test, in which it could only be rejected at the five percent level, still our 
chosen level for critical values for all tests in both equations. Non-stationarity of the residuals in 
these static VEC equations is thus rejected, confirming the previous result obtained with the 
Johansen cointegration tests at the six percent level. 
  15 
5.3. Estimation of the Dynamic Equations: 
  Two questions remain unanswered. What is the number of cointegrating relations, and 
what is the direction of causation? A major practical problem in the estimation of the above VEC 
equations is the determination of the number of lags. We followed Hendry’s “General-to-
Specific” Methodology (Gilbert, 1986, provides an excellent exposition), setting T =10 in 
equations (3) and (4) and proceed to simplify the model toward a parsimonious form by means of 
likelihood ratio and F tests to eliminate redundant variables. We start with a relatively large 
number of lags to ensure the absence of significant autocorrelation in the residuals from the 
dynamic equations (Hendry, 1986: 88).  
We report the estimates of the parsimonious model in Table 8. The first column shows 
the estimates for the first dynamic equation (the rate of growth in government size). The second 
column displays the estimates for the second dynamic equation (the rate of growth of per capita 
real GDP). The most important conclusion is that causation runs from economic growth to 
government size growth, but not the reverse. Indeed, Wald tests for the hypothesis that the cross-
terms in the second dynamic equation are simultaneously equal to zero cannot be rejected at 
conventional levels. Similar Wald tests on the joint significance of the cross-terms in the first 
dynamic equation produce very different results: the null hypothesis that the cross-terms are 
jointly statistically insignificant can be rejected at the 1 percent level. These results provide 
confirmation of the block exogeneity tests presented before in section 3.3. 
  The insignificance of the lagged residual term in the second dynamic equation and its 
significance in the first equation conclusively settles the causality question, regardless of the 
joint significance of the cross-terms (Granger, 1988). There is only one cointegrating equation 
  16(static equation 1) and Granger-causality runs in only one direction. Economic growth leads to a 
larger share of federal government expenditures, but not the reverse. For the United States, at 
least, the conclusion is that previous evidence that government is bad for growth must be based 
on poorly specified models. 
The Durbin-Watson statistic associated to both dynamic equations’ estimates suggests 
that there is no significant first order autocorrelation problem in the residuals, the number one 
criterion for model selection in Hendry’s methodology (Hendry, 1986: 88). A wide variety of 
tests were applied to both series of residuals to check for the validity of the stationarity 
hypothesis. While results are not displayed here, the unit root hypotheses are rejected in all four 
tests (ADF, DF-GLS, Phillips-Perron, and KPSS) at the one percent level. Figure 4(a) and Figure 
4(b) display the graphs of the residuals and confirm the message from the statistical tests: 
residuals do not seem to be non-stationary. 
 
6. Conclusion 
A number of studies over the past two decades have considered whether a larger government is 
good or bad for growth, but the results have not been conclusive. In this paper, we use annual 
data for federal government expenditures and real per-capita GDP for the United States, going 
back to 1792, and we carefully test the time-series properties of these variables for stationarity, 
cointegration, and Granger causality, an series of steps some studies have begun but not 
completed. Standard Granger causality tests conducted outside the cointegration framework for 
up to ten lags reveal that Granger causality is unidirectional, running from economic growth to 
government size growth. The log levels of these variables are both non-stationary and are 
cointegrated.  
  17After a careful study of the issue of causation within the cointegration framework, we 
find that faster growth appears to cause a larger government in the long run, but we don’t find 
significant evidence supporting the hypothesis that the relative size of federal government 
expenditures affects growth either up or down. Our results confirm some of the results reported 
by Islam (2001), even though our sample size was much larger, and our investigation and our 
focus was on uncovering the relationship running from government size to economic growth 
rather than the reverse. Because the U.S. is a country with high marks for economic freedom and 
democratic institutions, our results are also consistent with several cross-country studies that 
found the negative effects of government size on economic growth were much larger in countries 
with less freedom and democracy. 
It remains to be seen, however, whether these results can be generalized to other 
countries. Relative to other countries at similar levels of development, the U.S. is somewhat of 
an outlier in that the relative size and role of government is less and the growth in government’s 
size has been much less, as well. Our study did not consider the effects of state and local 
government, nor did we specify a growth model that considered other factors. Much work 
remains to determine whether or not the assertion that more government causes lower growth 
applies elsewhere. 
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Table 1: Average Growth and Federal Government Expenditures 


















          
1792-1860  4.3%  1.3%  2.5%   2.5%   0.7% 
1861-1870  3.3%  0.9%  4.3%   9.4%   5.4% 
1871-1915  3.7%  1.5%  5.0%   3.0%   0.7% 
1916-1929 3.9% 2.5% 5.3%  7.8%  8.3%
1792-1929 4.0%  1.5%  3.9%   3.7%    3.7% 
          
1930-1950 3.5%  2.4%  9.7%  18.0%  13.4% 
          
1951-1970 3.8%  2.3%  2.7%  21.4%    1.8% 
1971-1990 3.2%  2.2%  2.4%  23.8%    1.1% 
1991-2004 3.0% 1.8% 1.4% 20.3%  1.8%
1950-2094 3.4%  2.1%  2.3%  21.9%    2.2% 
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Table 2: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
      
0 316.18  N/A    0.000153  -3.111 -3.078 -3.097 
1  327.86  23.00   0.000142  -3.187      -3.088*      -3.147* 
2 332.86    9.76  0.000140  -3.197 -3.033 -3.130 
3 334.99    4.11  0.000143  -3.178 -2.949 -3.085 
4  347.41     23.74*   0.000130*      -3.262*  -2.967  -3.142 
5 350.11    5.09  0.000133  -3.249 -2.888 -3.103 
6 352.42    4.34  0.000135  -3.232 -2.806 -3.060 
7 353.64    2.25  0.000139  -3.204 -2.713 -3.006 
8 356.21    4.71  0.000141  -3.190 -2.633 -2.965 
9 357.59    2.51  0.000145  -3.164 -2.542 -2.912 
10 361.79    7.51  0.000145  -3.166  -2.478  -2.888 
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
LogL: Log Likelihood 
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
FPE: Final prediction error 
AIC: Akaike information criterion 
SC: Schwarz information criterion 
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
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Table 3: Vector Autoregression Estimates 
 
Equation 1  Equation 2 
Δg  Δy 
Δgt-1 0.143 0.014 
[ 2.11]  [ 1.26] 
Δgt-2 -0.207 -0.010 
[-3.01] [-0.90] 
Δgt-3 0.0235 -0.014 
[ 0.34]  [-1.23] 
Δgt-4 -0.123 -0.013 
[-1.81] [-1.19] 
Δyt-1 0.376 0.262 
[ 0.87]  [ 3.77] 
Δyt-2 0.319 -0.020 
[ 0.72]  [-0.28] 
Δyt-3 0.639 -0.029 
[ 1.44]  [-0.40] 
Δyt-4 -1.500 -0.169 
[-3.53] [-2.46] 
Constant 0.016  0.016 
[ 0.75]  [ 4.69] 
 R-squared  0.142  0.155 
 Adj. R-squared  0.107  0.121 
 Sum sq. resides  13.219  0.346 
 S.E. equation  0.258  0.042 
 F-statistic  4.10  4.55 
 Log likelihood  -8.53  370.43 
 Akaike AIC  0.169  -3.475 
 Schwarz SC  0.313  -3.331 
 [t-statistics in brackets] 
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Table 4: Block-Exogeneity Tests 
Pairwise Granger F-Tests 
A) H0: Lags of Δy are NOT block-exogenous 
 Obs  F-stat  p-value 
4 LAGS  208  4.01  0.0037 
5 LAGS  207  2.96  0.0135 
6 LAGS  206  2.90  0.0100 
7 LAGS  205  2.72  0.0105 
8 LAGS  204  2.47  0.0143 
9 LAGS  203  2.21  0.0230 
10 LAGS  202  2.17  0.0212 
 
B) H0: Lags of Δg are NOT Block-exogenous 
 Obs  F-stat  p-value 
4 LAGS  208  1.58  0.1812 
5 LAGS  207  1.79  0.1174 
6 LAGS  206  1.48  0.1872 
7 LAGS  205  1.18  0.3179 
8 LAGS  204  1.32  0.2381 
9 LAGS  203  1.04  0.4078 
10 LAGS  202  1.40  0.1820 
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Table 5: Unit Root Tests for both y and g 
 
Variables     ADF    /1     DF-GLS  /2     Phillips-    KPSS   /4 
        Perron   /3   
Levels  
y  0.49 3.04 0.83 1.85 
g  -1.86 -1.51 -1.51 1.47 
1
st Differences         
y  -10.7 -8.83 -10.27  0.16 
g  -11.42 -3.31 -13.95 0.07 
Notes: 
/1: The null hypothesis is that the series contains an autoregressive unit root.  
ADF is the t-ratio corresponding to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test.  
The critical values for 1%, 5%, and 10% risk levels are, respectively: -3.46, -2.87, -2.57 
 
/2: The null hypothesis is that the series contains an autoregressive unit root 
DF-GLS is the t-ratio corresponding to the Dickey-Fuller test applied on a GLS regression  
The critical values for 1%, 5%, and 10% risk levels are, respectively: -2.57, -1.94, -1.61 
/3: The null hypothesis is that the series contains an autoregressive unit root.  
Phillips-Perron is the t-ratio stemming from an autoregression of the series with no lagged first diff. 
The critical values for 1%, 5%, and 10% risk levels are, respectively: -3.46, -2.87, -2.57 
 
/4: The null hypothesis is that the series is stationary (i.e., no autoregressive unit root exists) 
KPSS is the Lagrange Multiplier, LM statistic.  
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Table 6: Johansen's cointegrations tests 
Four lags in Differenced Variables 
Deterministic linear trend allowed in data 
H0: No cointegration equation exists 
Trace Stat  Max Eigen Stat 
14.63 13.70 
Critical values (at 5% level) 
Trace Stat  Max Eigen Stat 
15.49 14.27 
p-values 
Trace Test  Max Eigen Test 
0.07 0.06 
 
H0: No more than 1 cointegration eq.exists 
Trace Stat  Max Eigen Stat 
0.92 0.92 
Critical values (at 5% level) 
Trace Stat  Max Eigen Stat 
3.84 3.84 
p-values 
Trace Test  Max Eigen Test 
0.34 0.34 
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Table 7: Error Correction Model, Static Equations 
 
 
FIRST STATIC EQUATION  
Dependent Variable: g 
C y   
coefficients -9.544  0.791   
t-stat -31.85  22.59   
p-value 0.0000  0.0000   
R-squared  0.707    F-statistic  510.24 
Adjusted R-squared  0.706    Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000 
S.E. of regression  0.543  Durbin-Watson stat  0.25 
Included observation 213 
Stationarity tests applied to Residuals of Static Equation 1   
stat critical  value  (5%)   
ADF test  -4.26 -2.88   
DF GLS test  -2.58 -1.94   
PP test  -4.03 -2.88   
KPSS test   0.17   0.46   
 
SECOND STATIC EQUATION 
Dependent Variable: y 
C g   
coefficients 11.015  0.8940   
t-stat 92.82  22.5885   
p-value 0.0000  0.0000   
R-squared  0.707   F-statistic  510.24 
Adjusted R-squared  0.706   Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000 
S.E. of regression  0.577 Durbin-Watson stat  0.18 
Included observations 213 
Stationarity tests applied to Residuals of Static Equation 2   
stat critical  value  (5%)   
ADF test  -3.195 -2.875   
DF GLS test  -3.616 -1.942   
PP test  -3.318 -2.875   
KPSS test  0.882 0.463   
Notes: 
H0 is Non-stationarity of residuals for ADF, DF-GLS and PP tests 
H0 is Stationarity of residuals for KPSS test 
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Table 8: Error Correction Model, Dynamic Equations 
 
  First Dynamic Equation  Second Dynamic Equation 
  Dependent Variable: Δg Dependent  Variable:  Δy 
Δgt-1 0.199 0.016 
 [2.98]*  [1.44] 
Δgt-2 -0.107 -0.011 
 [-1.57]  [-0.98] 
Δyt-1 0.558 0.268 
 [1.38]  [4.00]* 
Δyt-4 -1.229 -0.198 
 [-3.08]*  [-3.02]* 
Constant 0.022  0.016 
 [1.07]  [4.66]* 




R-squared 0.160  0.137 
Adjusted R-squared  0.139  0.116 
S.E. of regression  0.253  0.0418 
  F-statistic   7.69*   6.43* 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.96  2.00 
t-statistics in [.] below coefficients; * = significant at 5% level 
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